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STUDYING THE PROPERTIES OF PIXELS PERMUTATIONS BASED 
ON DISCRETIZED STANDARD MAP 
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Abstract. In this article, we described specifics of pixels permutations based on the discretized, two-dimensional Chirikov standard map. Some properties 
of the discretized Chirikov map can be used by an attacker to recover the original images that are studied. For images with dimensions N  N the 
vulnerability of permutations allows for brute force attacks, and shown is the ability of an intruder to restore the original image without setting the value of 
keys permutations. Presented is also, successful cryptographic attack on the encrypted image through permutation of pixels. It is found that for images with 
dimension N  N the maximum number of combinations is equal to NN-1. A modified Chirikov map was proposed with improved permutation properties, 
due to the use of two nonlinearities, that increase the keys space to N2!. 
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BADANIE WŁAŚCIWOŚCI PERMUTACJI PIKSELI W OPARCIU 
O ZDYSKRETYZOWANĄ MAPĘ STANDARDOWĄ 
Streszczenie. W tym artykule opisana została specyfika permutacji pikseli w oparciu o zdyskretyzowaną, dwuwymiarową mapę standardową Czirikowa. 
Niektóre właściwości tej mapy mogą zostać użyte przez napastnika, aby odzyskać oryginalne obrazy, które są badane. Jeśli chodzi o obrazy o wymiarach 
N  N, permutacje są podatne na agresywne ataki. Pokazana jest również możliwość odzyskania przez intruza oryginalnego obrazu bez ustawienia 
wartości permutacyjnych. Przedstawiony został również udany atak kryptograficzny na zaszyfrowany obraz za pomocą permutacji pikseli. Stwierdzono, że 
w przypadku obrazów o wymiarach N  N, maksymalna liczba kombinacji jest równa NN-1. Zaproponowano zmodyfikowaną mapę Czirikowa z ulepszonymi 
właściwościami permutacji, dzięki wprowadzeniu dwóch nieliniowości, które zwiększyły zestaw możliwych kombinacji do N2!. 
Słowa kluczowe: zdyskretyzowana mapa standardowa, permutacja pikselowa, możliwe kombinacje, precyzja obliczeń 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades the application of deterministic 
chaos for information security became an active field of research 
[2, 6, 8]. Among chaos–based cryptography algorithms, a 
significant part is designed for image encryption. The most 
commonly used design is cipher with two mean stages: pixels 
permutation and diffusion which can be repeated several times [5]. 
Permutations of pixels are needed to break relations between 
adjacent pixels and prevent correlation attacks. The goal of 
diffusion is to transform the uneven distribution of color pixels 
into uniform, thereby concealing the statistical properties of the 
original image. Typically for pixels permutations, used are 
discretized versions of Standard, Baker or Cat map [5] or their 
modifications. For the diffusion step typically is used PRNG 
based on one, two or multi-dimensional maps. Along with the new 
encryption algorithms based on deterministic chaos, the works 
dedicated to cryptanalysis have been presented [1, 3, 10, 12]. In 
[10] was proposed one of the earliest chaotic image encryption 
algorithms which uses discretized version of Chirikov standard 
map for pixels permutations [4]. It was later shown in [9] that in 
this map, the first pixel does not change its position after any 
number of permutation cycles. To eliminate this vulnerability, it 
was suggested to use mechanism, which essence is to shift first 
pixel into any position in the image. Also, there were given [9] 
recommendations for minimum size images for encryption and 
minimum number of permutation cycles. 
 In this paper we focus on cryptographic security of pixels 
permutations based on the discretized two-dimensional Chirikov 
standard map considering its geometric properties. We explore the 
resistance of permutations to brute force attack and we find 
property that greatly reduces the key space of permutations 
compared to the known assessment of key space made in [9]. To 
eliminate the identified vulnerabilities, we propose to modify the 
discretized standard map by entering additional nonlinearity. Also, 
we estimate the key space of permutations for double-precision 
arithmetic and we show that the key space is very small compared 
to the theoretically possible maximum. Please note that we 
consider changes as only one stage of the chaotic algorithms. 
In section 1 specifics of pixels permutations based on 
discretized standard map and power of key space are described. In 
section 2 shown is a cryptographic attack on the encrypted image 
by permutation of pixels and reduced key space. 
1. Specifics of permutations based on discretized 
standard map 
As noted above, in [5] was introduced discretized standard 
map for pixels permutations, that is given by the following 
iterative equations: 
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where 
ix  and iy  are coordinates,  0; 1i N  , K – a control 
parameter which is a positive integer, N  is the number of pixels 
in width or height of the original image. As we can see, (1) is 
suitable only for bitmaps with N  N dimensions. 
Properties of the discretized map (1) are not as perfect as the 
original [3], but it can be implemented in the integer 
ix  and iy  
values of intervals, which reduce the computational complexity 
and are more convenient to encryption data applications [5]. 
The procedure of one cycle of pixels permutation for bitmap 
with dimension N  N in RGB format is as follows: 
a) For each pixel 
ix  and iy  there is a calculation of (1) made to 
form its new coordinates 
1ix   and 1iy   in encrypted image.  
b) Coordinates 
1ix   and 1iy   in encrypted image record pixel 
color values (RGB) of the original image. 
c) These operations (1 and 2) are carried out sequentially for 
each pixel. 
Let’s analyze features of pixels permutations based on map 
(1), considering its geometric properties for bitmaps with N  N 
dimensions. 
1.1. Features of permutations 
Any picture with dimension N  N has 2 1N   diagonals (see 
Fig. 1). The first and the last diagonals are composed of one 
element. Number of elements in the diagonal varies from 1 to N . 
The first element of the diagonal is the pixel with the lowest 
ix . 
Permutations based on discretized standard map have following 
properties:  
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Fig. 1. Diagonals of any image with N × N dimensions 
a) The first pixel in coordinates  0;  0  does not change its 
position at any number of permutation cycles, it can be used 
by cryptanalyst to crack the encrypted images [9]. 
When 0ix  , 0iy   we use (1) and calculate that 
1 0ix   , 1 0iy   . 
b) Each column after one cycle of permutation consists of two 
diagonals with numbers n and N + n,  2; 1n N   except 
the diagonal N. It is because the diagonal N consists of N 
elements. This property of the permutation is shown in 
Fig. 2b, where each column of the image after one 
permutation cycle contains pixels with two colors. Each 
square is a pixel in an image sized 1010 (see Fig. 2a). All 
pixels in the diagonal after the permutation will always be 
placed in one column. Consistently placed diagonal elements 
(see Fig. 2b) for which the original image: 
  modi ix y N C const    (2) 
where 0... 1C N   corresponding column element of the 
encrypted image (Fig. 2b), according to (1) 
1 .ix C const    
When the equation for calculation of coordinate line 
1iy   can 
be written as: 
  1 modi iy y KC N    (3) 
where 
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it means that after permutation, pixels coordinates which 
satisfy (2) are placed in one column consecutively, but are 
shifted in relation to the initial position, which depends on the 
parameters K and C1. 
c) Pixels for which coordinates the equation is true: 
 
1 ( )mod 0i i ix x y N     (4) 
always after the permutation will be in the first column. By 
doing so, the coordinates of the rows will not change because 
of (1). Let’s take into account (4) 
1 0ix   , 1i iy y   
(Fig. 2b). 
   
a        b 
Fig. 2. Image (10×10) – original (a), after one cycle of permutation by K = 123 (b) 
Each pixel diagonal can be uniquely identified by a column 
number that forms this diagonal. Using properties (2–4), a 
cryptanalyst can try to reproduce the original image by moving the 
pixels in columns to the place of pixels in diagonals.  
1.2. Analysis of key space 
The row number where a pixel may be moved after the 
permutation by 
i ix y N  , 0i ix y   depends on the value of 
the parameter K and term KC1 in (3). Thus, for pixels that are in 
the first column, their position in the original image is uniquely 
known. Two consecutive columns contain the pixels of two 
neighboring diagonals. 
Therefore, there are possible only N variants to shift elements 
of the second column in relation to the first. Given the fact that the 
pixels of adjacent diagonals slightly differ among themselves, 
shift between them can be determined by the maximum of the 
correlation function. 
Given the map properties (2) and (3), the number of 
combinations of a brute force attack that is needed to restore the 
original image after one permutation cycle equals to 
1NN   which 
is much less than 
2 !N  as was considered in the evaluated key 
space for this map in [9, 12]. 
1.3. Subkeys properties 
Let’s consider another property of the standard map (1) that 
can be used to break pixels permutations. Let’s assume that:  
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Then, if 
1ix const   then number iK  is a key of 
permutation in the diagonal in a column. In total, there are N 
subkeys, while some of them may be the same.  
 
Fig. 3. Histogram of subkeys distribution for image sized 256×256 pixels at 
K = 1000003 
From Fig. 3 one can understand that each subkey was found a 
limited number of times ,m N  which reduces the key space of 
permutation in comparison with 
1.NN   Setting a limit on the 
number of appearances of permutation subkeys is possible to 
estimate the key space for a brute force attack as the number of 
permutations of N different elements of N, provided that each 
element of it occurred fewer than m times [11]:  
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 (5) 
However, these properties of subkeys can be used by an 
attacker to select the most likely key at the beginning of attacks, 
and thus increase their chances of success. Reducing key space of 
(1) through dependence between the N and m according to (5) is 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Reducing the key space, % 
N m = 3 m = 5 m = 7 
64 72.6 3.2 0.046 
128 93.1 6.81 0.11 
256 99.6 13.7 0.11 
 
In Tab. 1 it can be seen that at 5m   the key space is greatly 
reduced. For 5m   the key space is weakly reduced. 
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1.4. The effect of limiting precision of calculations 
As it is known, a set of different states of chaotic system is 
defined by precision of calculations [9] and increases with 
increased precision. For permutations using (1), this effect is also 
true. We estimate the key space using system (1), provided that 
the parameter K is a positive integer. In calculations of double 
precision, the mantissa is 52 bits. The range of integers that can be 
accurately represented in the form of double precision is 1...253 
[14]. Given the possible steps 2, the number of different positive 
integer values of K is 261.9. In [9] it is recommended to use for 
permutations an image which size is of at least 128N  . Thus 
we can say that the most appropriate break permutations based on 
the standard map are the brute force of a possible key values, 
because: 
 
1 127 894.6 61.9128 2 2NN     (6) 
The real key space for modern computing systems is small 
compared to theoretically possible. Please note that we have 
established a number of options of the brute force in various 
possible methods of attack, without considering time complexity 
of their implementation. 
2. Cryptographic attack based on the correlation 
between adjacent pixels 
Considering the facts that there are possible only N variants of 
shifting elements of the second column in relation to the first and 
that pixels in adjacent diagonals differ slightly from each other, 
we can find a shift between pixels of adjacent columns by the 
maximum of the correlation function. 
2.1. Cryptographic attack based on the correlation 
between adjacent pixels 
We organized our cryptographic attack on permutations based 
on (1) as follows: 
a) For two adjacent columns we calculated the value of cross-
correlation function: 
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b) Defined k for which 
  0 1 1max , ,...,k nc c c c   (8) 
c) Column 1i  shifted to the K positions down, i.e. 
 
1, 1, modi n i n Kx x N    (9) 
d) Repeated steps a, b and c for remaining columns in the image. 
The algorithm has been tested on the image in Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4. Original test image 
After the first and second permutation cycles, the original 
image is successfully restored (see Fig. 5). However, there is a 
slight distortion. After three permutation cycles, the correlation 
between adjacent pixels is lost and the restoration of the original 
image by this method is impossible. Thus, considering the 
correlation, image properties can be broken by 2 cycles of 
permutations. 
 
a   b  
c   d  
d   e  
Fig. 5 a; c; e – encrypted test image after one, two and three cycles of permutation, 
respectively; b; d; f – recovered image 
2.2. Modified standard map with a maximum key 
space for permutations 
In order to get the maximum size of the key space of 
permutation for the system (1), it is necessary to introduce non-
linearity in the variable 
1ix  . Our proposed map in the discretized 
form is described by the following recurrent system of equations: 
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where ,x yK K  – parameters (keys). Jacobian system (10): 
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, i.e., map saves the 
area and is potentially useful for permutations in encryption 
algorithms. The drawback of the map (10) is the need to have two 
sinus functions computed. Considering that value of trigonometric 
functions in digital means are calculated using the Taylor series of 
desired functions, the number of mathematical operations in 
system (1) is less complex in comparison to (10). 
Let us consider the effectiveness of permutations based on 
(10). The encrypted image after one cycle of permutations is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Permutation of pixels of a test image using (10) 
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In the encrypted image contours are not observed and pixels of 
different colors are uniformly distributed within its size. To 
evaluate the similarity of two images, we use the correlation 
coefficient [7]. Correlation coefficient close to zero means that 
two images are independent and use the map characterized by 
good mixing properties.  
The calculation results for different number of permutation 
cycles using (1) and (10) are presented in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Correlation of image pixels depending on the number of cycles n in 
permutations N = 512, K = Kx = Ky = 10000 
n 
Correlation 
of pixels 
Standard map 
with one nonlinearity (1) with two nonlinearity (10) 
0 
horizontal 0.9753 0.9753 
vertical 0.9853 0.9853 
1 
horizontal 0.0972 -0.0011 
vertical 0.9699 0.0375 
2 
horizontal -0.0040 0.00006 
vertical 0.0969 0.00063 
3 
horizontal -0.00075 -0.0015 
vertical -0.0070 -0.0034 
4 
horizontal 0.0011 -0.0026 
vertical -0.00025 -0.0029 
 
Systems (1) and (10) are explored with the parameters 
K = Kx = Ky = 10000 For the original image (Fig. 4) the correlation 
coefficient between the adjacent pixels in columns and rows 
equals to 0.9759 and 0.9857 respectively. One cycle of 
permutations with a standard map does not lead to uniform 
dissemination of pixels (Fig. 5 a), because preserved was a strong 
correlation between pixels in columns. 
From Tab. 2 it can be deduced that system (10) compared to 
(1) has better correlation properties. Efficiency of permutations 
with (1) and (10) is seen in Fig 7. 
a  b  
c  d  
e  f  
Fig. 7. The relationship between the adjacent pixels: a; b – in the horizontal and 
vertical for test image (Fig. 4); c; d – after one cycle of permutations using the map 
(1); e; f – after one cycle of permutations using the map (10) 
For one cycle permutations performed by system (1), pixels 
are grouped along the diagonal (see Fig. 7 c, d). After one cycle 
permutations (10), relationships between adjacent pixels in rows 
(Fig. 7 e) and columns (Fig. 7 f) have the form of a square, which 
means no statistical relationship between them. 
3. Conclusion 
We analyzed permutations of pixels based on discretized 
Chirikov standard map considering its geometric features. We 
discovered specific properties of a map that can be used by an 
attacker to recover the original image. It is shown that the 
permutations are much weaker before brute force attacks, and it is 
possible to recover the original image without setting the key 
value (key) permutations. For images with dimension N  N the 
number of combinations is 
1NN   for one permutation cycle 
instead of 
2 !N  as was previously thought. In order to get the 
maximum size of key space of permutation for the discretized 
standard map, we proposed to introduce additional nonlinearity. 
Please note that the evaluation of key space of permutations is 
received on the condition that calculations are made with absolute 
precision. 
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